PHYSICS

Fr. 1

Diogenes the Oinoandian and friend of Athens. Epitome on nature.

Fr. 3

[And I wanted to refute those who accuse natural science of being unable to be of any benefit to us.] In this way, [citizens], even though I am not engaging in public affairs, I say these things through the inscription just as if I were taking action, and in an endeavour to prove that what benefits our nature, namely freedom from disturbance, is identical for one and all.

And so, having described the second reason for the inscription, I now go on to mention my mission and to explain its character and nature.

Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep) moreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation. These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.

Fr. 2

... [observing that most people suffer from false notions about things and do not listen to the body] when it brings important and just [accusations] against the soul, alleging that it is unwarrantably mauled and maltreated by the soul and dragged to things which are not necessary (in fact, the wants of the body are small and easy to obtain — and the soul too can live well by sharing in their enjoyment — while those of the soul are both great and difficult to obtain and, besides being of no benefit to our nature, actually involve dangers). So (to reiterate what I was saying) observing that these people are in this predicament, I bewailed their behaviour and wept over the wasting of their lives, and I considered it the responsibility of a good man to give [benevolent] assistance, to the utmost of one's ability, to those of them who are well-constituted. [This] is the first reason [for the inscription].

I declare that the [vain] fear of [death and that] of the [gods grip many] of us, [and that] joy [of real value is generated not by theatres] and [...and] baths [and perfumes] and ointments, [which we] have left to the masses, [but by natural science...]

Fr. 4

... us ... the first ...

... [as is supposed by] some of the philosophers and especially the Socratics. They say that pursuing natural science and busying oneself with investigation of [celestial phenomena] is superfluous and unprofitable, and they do [not even] deign [to concern themselves with such matters.]

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

And the so-called [ephectic philosophers], of whom Lacydes [of Cyrene]...

Fr. 6

[As for the first bodies, also] called elements, which on the one hand have subsisted from the beginning [and] are indestructible, and [on the other hand] generate things, we shall explain what [they are] after we have demolished the theories of others.

Well, Heraclitus of Ephesus identified fire as elemental, Thales of Miletus water, Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximenes air, Empedocles of Acragas fire and air and water and earth, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae the homoeomeries of each thing, and the Stoics matter and God. As for Democritus of Abdera, he did well to identify atoms as elemental, but since his conception of them was in some respects mistaken, he will be considered in the exposition of our theories. 

Now we shall bring charges against the said men, not out of contentiousness towards them, but because we wish the truth to be safeguarded; and we shall deal with Heraclitus first, since he has been placed first on our list.

You are mistaken, Heraclitus, in saying that fire is elemental, for neither is it indestructible, since we observe it being destroyed, nor can it generate things...

Fr. 7

........................ this .......... is nothing ....... void ....... to be acted upon, .... to be acted upon .... infinity .... nothing ..... cannot ... the last, because he (?) knows it.

Even Democritus erred in a manner unworthy of himself when he said that atoms alone among existing things have true reality, while everything else exists by convention. For, according to your account, Democritus, it will be impossible for us even to live, let alone discover the truth, since we shall be unable to protect ourselves from either fire or slaughter or [any other force].

Fr. 8

[Since the first bodies cannot be broken up by anyone,] whether he is god or man, one is left to conclude that these things are [absolutely] indestructible, [beyond the reach of] necessity. For if [they were destroyed,] in accordance with [necessity, into the nonexistent, all things would have perished.]

Fr. 9

[And] often mirrors too will be my witnesses [that likenesses] and appearances are real [entities.] For what I say will certainly not be denied at all by the image which will give supporting evidence on oath in mirrors. We should not see ourselves in them, nor indeed would [any reflection] be created, [if there were not a continual flow being borne from us to the mirrors and bringing back an image] to us. For this too is convincing proof of the effluence, seeing that each of the parts is carried to the point straight ahead.

Now the images that flow from objects, by impinging on our eyes, cause us both to see external realities and, [through entering our soul, to think of them. So it is through impingements] that the soul receives in turn the things seen by the eyes; and after the impingements of the first images, our nature is rendered porous in such a manner that, even if the objects which it first saw are no longer present, images similar to the first ones are received by the mind, [creating visions both when we are awake and in sleep.]

[And let us not be surprised] that this happens even when we are asleep; for images flow to us in the same way at that time too. How so? When we are asleep, with all the senses as if it were paralysed and extinguished [again in] sleep, the soul, which is [still wide] awake [and yet is unable to recognise] the predicament and condition of the senses at that time, on receiving the images that approach it, conceives an untested and false opinion concerning them, as if it were actually apprehending the solid nature of true realities; for the means of testing the opinion are asleep at that time. These are the senses; for the rule and standard [of truth] with respect to [our dreams] remain [these.]

[In opposition to] your [argument, Democritus, we now say this: the nature of dreams is in no way god-sent, as you maintain, or monitory, but rather dreams are produced, I say, by] certain [natural entities, with the result that the fallacious argument is turned aside,] for, [as I have shown, the same images which cause vision cause dreams as well as thought.]

Fr. 10

... asleep ... So visions are not empty illusions of the mind, as the Stoics hold. For indeed, if on the one hand they call them empty on the ground that, while they have a corporeal nature, it is exceedingly subtle and does not impinge on the senses, they have expressed themselves wrongly, [since it was necessary to call] them corporeal, despite their subtlety. If on the other hand they call them empty on the ground that they have no corporeal nature at all —and it is in fact this rather than the former which they mean—, how can the empty be represented?

What then are they? Visions in fact have a composition which is subtle and eludes our sight, [but which is not empty.] For the mind, being superior in subtlety, .... provides ... the starting-point and ... things ... and moves ........... imagining that we shall be struck with a sword or shall fall from a precipice, we spring up in consequence of our fear, even when we are in company. To these examples [I add this further one: since in our dreams,] as also when we are awake, we perform sexual acts, it is no good arguing that the pleasure we derive from them is unreal because we are asleep. So one must not call these visions empty, since they actually possess such great power.

On the other hand, however, if they are not empty , that does not mean that they are sentient and rational and really chat to us, as Democritus supposes; for films which are so subtle and lack the depth of a solid constitution cannot possibly possess these faculties.

So these theorists, the Stoics and Democritus, went astray in opposite directions: the Stoics deprive visions of a power which they do have, while Democritus endows them with a power which they do not have. In fact the nature of [dreams]...

Fr. 12

[The caves which they frequented with the advance of time, as they sought shelter from] wintry storms, gave them the conception of houses, while the wraps which they made for their bodies, as they protected them either with foliage or with plants or even (for they were already killing animals) with skins, gave them the notion of clothes —not yet plaited, but perhaps made by felting or some such process. Then the advance of time inspired them or their descendants with the idea of the loom as well.

So no arts, [any more than] these, should be explained by the introduction of Athena or any other deity; for all were the offspring of needs and experiences in conjunction with time.

And with regard to vocal sounds —I mean the words and phrases, of which the earth-born human beings produced the first utterances—, let us not introduce Hermes as teacher, as some claim he was (for this is palpable drivel), nor let us credit those philosophers who say that it was by deliberate invention and teaching that names were assigned to things in order that human beings might have [distinctive designations] for them to facilitate their communication with one another. It is absurd, indeed more absurd than any absurdity, as well as quite impossible, that any one individual should have assembled such vast multitudes (at that time there were as yet no kings, and indeed, in the absence of any vocal sounds, no writing; and with regard to these multitudes [it would have been quite impossible, except by means] of decree, for their assembly to have taken place) and, having assembled them, should [have taken hold of] a rod (?) and proceeded to teach them like an elementary schoolmaster, touching each object and saying «let this be called "stone," this "wood," this "human being" or "dog" [or] "ox" or ["ass"] ...»

Fr. 13

[The heavenly bodies, when the whirls of air] cause [such strong movement], are all [violently] tossed about, but some meet one another, while others do not; and some pursue a straight course up to a certain point, others, like the sun and moon, an oblique one, while others revolve in the same place, like the Bear; moreover, some move in a high orbit, others however in a low one. Yes, and this is a fact of which most people are ignorant: they suppose the sun at any rate to be as low as it appears to be, whereas it is not as low; for if it were so, the earth and everything on it would necessarily be set ablaze. So it is its image which we see low, not the sun itself. However, this is to digress. 

Let us now discuss risings and settings and related matters after making this preliminary point: if one is investigating things that are not directly perceptible, and if one sees that several explanations are possible, it is reckless to make a dogmatic pronouncement concerning any single one; such a procedure is characteristic of a seer rather than a wise man. It is correct, however, to say that, while all explanations are possible, this one is more plausible than that. 

It is therefore possible that the sun [is] a disc resembling red-hot charcoal [and] of an extremely fine texture, [lifted up by the] winds and [functioning like] a spring, in that some fire [flows away] from it, while other fire flows [into] it from the [surroundings], on account of their multifarious [mixture], in aggregations of small [parts]. Thus it is [of itself naturally] sufficient for the world ... 

Fr. 14

Hail, not unreasonably, is produced by a fine, loose conglomeration, which is due to the [self-moving energy] of what surrounds it and [is formed] either by a wind [that is cold but high in the air or by filmy snow.]

Fr. 15

... all men hoped ................ at a loss. For if they experience distinct visions, and are unable to discover how these are produced, understandably, I think, they are involved in apprehension; and sometimes [they are] even convinced [that there is a] creator ...

Fr. 16

..... and [they vehemently] denounce the [most pious people] as [atheistic]. And in fact it will become evident that it is not we [who deny] the [gods, but others.]

Thus [Diagoras of Melos, with certain others who closely followed his] theory, categorically asserted that gods do not exist and [vigorously] attacked [all those who thought otherwise.]

Protagoras of Abdera in effect put forward the same view as Diagoras, but expressed it differently to avoid its excessive audacity. For he said that he did not know whether gods exist, which is the same as saying that he knew that they do not exist. If indeed he had balanced the first statement with «However, I do not know that they do not exist,» [perhaps] he [would] almost have a [circumlocution] to [avoid the appearance of denying] the gods completely. [But he said] «I do not know that they exist,» [and not] «I do not know that they do not exist,» doing [exactly] the same [as Diagoras, who indefatigably did not stop] saying that [he did] not [know] that they exist. [Therefore,] as I say, [either Protagoras in that case] in effect put forward [the same view as Diagoras or ...]

Fr. 17

..................................... [in a chariot,] making Triptolemus mount one and providing him with most wretched [toils] ..................................................... For indeed, while honouring supreme Zeus and Demeter as deities, [we regard human beings] not as [their] slaves, [but as their friends.]

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................ that we may not suppose, having shared in judging what is still the subject of dispute, ...

................ [Let us not think that the gods are capable of examining people who are unjust] and base and [noble] and just. [Otherwise the] greatest disturbances [will be created in our souls.]

Fr. 19

[Let us then contradict Homer, who] talks [all sorts of nonsense] about them, [representing them sometimes as adulterers, sometimes as] lame, [sometimes as thievish, or even as being struck by mortals with a spear,] as well as inducing the craftsmen to produce inappropriate portrayals. Some statues of gods shoot arrows and are produced holding] a bow, [represented] like Heracles in Homer; others are attended by a body-guard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion; whereas we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them.

Well, then, you people, let us reverence the gods [rightly] both at festivals and on [unhallowed occasions, both] publicly [and privately], and let us observe the customs [of our fathers in relation to them and let not the imperishable beings be falsely accused at all] by us [in our vain fear that they are responsible for all misfortunes], bringing [sufferings to us] and [contriving burdensome obligations] for themselves. [And let us also call upon] them [by name] ...

Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .................

For god [is, I say], a living being, indestructible [and] blessed from [age to] age, having complete [self-sufficiency]. Moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea that he needed a city and fellow-citizens? Add to this absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have beings as fellow-citizens.

And there is this further point too: if he had created the world as a habitation and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created; I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate man — I do not say «god» —, having neither city nor fellow-citizens, he was destitute and roaming about at random. If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, all this is absurd; and if for the sake of men, there are yet other more absurd consequences.

Let its divide the discussion into two —the world and men themselves. And first let us speak about the world. 

[If indeed] all things are well arranged for men and nothing is antagonistic to them, our situation is like that of creatures made by a god. But let it be agreed first ....

Fr. 21

[The sea] has [excessively large] parts [of this earth] as its share, making a peninsula of the inhabited world; it is itself also full of yet other evils and, to cap all, has water which is not even drinkable, but briny and bitter, as if it had been purposely made like this by the god to prevent men from drinking.

Moreover, the so-called Dead Sea, which is really and truly dead (for it is never sailed), even deprives the local inhabitants of part of the land which they occupy; for it drives them away to a very considerable distance with its impetuous attacks and again floods their land as it withdraws, as though being on its guard lest they may do any cleaving of the earth with a plough. 

Such then are the things of the world. But the things of men themselves —let us now see if they are well arranged by divine providence. Let us begin like this: fine indeed, my friends, [is this] creature man— a creature that is [rational, gifted with prescience] of the future, and [capable of] leading a blissful [life – if] he possesses virtue for its own [sake and good dispositions. But] this creature [does not possess wisdom or indeed virtue, according to] the [Stoics who hold that view;] for the [great folly of all men prevents them.] And ... not ...

Fr. 22

... prostrate ourselves [before your images. By making men] tyrants you permit [outrages]. Let us also [refer to soldiers] who have inflicted numerous hardships on the [whole world. And] let us remember certain tribes and ..... in our ...

Who then, [father Zeus], if he hears [any talk of gods who allow] such great evils to afflict [mankind ... ?]

Fr. 23

[Enough of this subject, since it is] not necessary [to say anything] in reference to (?) the trap posed by meanings that [remain] concealed (?), unless [you] think that we do not appreciate what great misfortunes some people have experienced on account of this ambiguity and intricate obliqueness of oracles, or that this is the right time for us to give a thorough explanation of the kind of disaster which the Spartans suffered [after they had consulted the Delphic oracle concerning Arcadia.]

Fr. 24

In this case a natural philosopher [used arguments] of a dialectician, attempting the art of divination concerning dreams [and] wholly [trusting] them. For ................... [Antiphon, he says, predicted, when he was consulted by a runner,] who was just about to compete for a prize at Olympia, that he would be beaten. For the runner, he says, said, when consulting Antiphon, that he thought that an eagle was giving chase in his dreams. And Antiphon at once [told him to remember that an eagle always drives other birds before it and is itself last. However, he says that another interpreter declared, when he was consulted,] that the god did not say at all to the runner «you will be beaten,» and that the eagle is no cause for anxiety. If, thanks to Antiphon, he (the runner) had not shown him (the interpreter) up, so that [he was able to see that the dream could be interpreted in entirely different ways, he would not have suspected that he was receiving unreliable advice.] ... For ... thing ... as dreams testify ...

Fr. 25

[To the happy man, the unhappy man always seems more turbulent than him, since he is full of disturbance and confusion.]

Fr. 26

.....................................For indeed ...

Fr. 27

(No translatable text)

ETHICS

Fr. 28

Diogenes of Oinoanda’s epitome [on] emotions and [actions.]

Fr. 29

[There are many who] pursue philosophy for the sake of [wealth and fame], with the aim of procuring these either from private individuals or from kings, by whom philosophy is deemed to be some great and precious possession.

Well, it is not in order to gain any of the above-mentioned objectives that we have embarked upon the same undertaking, but so that we may enjoy happiness through attainment of the goal craved by nature.

The identity of this goal and how neither wealth can furnish it, nor political fame, nor royal office, nor a life of luxury and sumptuous banquets, nor pleasures of choice love-affairs, nor anything else, while philosophy [alone can secure it], we [shall now explain after setting the whole question before you. For we have had this writing inscribed in public] not [for ourselves,] but [for you, citizens, so that we might render it available to all of you in an easily accessible form without oral instruction.] And ... you ...

Fr. 29 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 1)

[The blessed and imperishable being] neither experiences troubles itself nor causes it to another, [so that it is not affected by feelings either anger or of favour; for it is to the weak that such emotions belong.]

Fr. 30 

... time ... and we contrived this in order that, even while [sitting at] home, [we might be able to exhibit] the goods of philosophy, not to all people here [indeed], but to those of them who are civil-spoken; and not least we did [this] for those who are called «foreigners,» though they are not really so. For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world.

I am not pressurising any of you into testifying thoughtlessly and unreflectively in favour of those who say «[this] is true» for [I have] not [laid down the law on] anything, [not even on] matters concerning the gods, [unless] together with [reasoning.]

[One thing] only I ask of you, [as I did also] just now: do not, even if [you should be] somewhat indifferent and listless, be [like] passers-by [in your approach] to the writings, [consulting] each [of them] in a patchy fashion and [omitting to read everything] ..

Fr. 30 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 2)

[Death] is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved is without sensation, [and what is without sensation is nothing to us.]

Fr. 31

[Let us, then, immediately begin by discussing pleasures, and] moreover [by carefully examining the arguments in detail] ...

Fr. 32

... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.

Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] .....

Fr. 32 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 6, 8)

[For the purpose of gaining security from men government and kingship are a natural good, so long as] this end can be procured [from them].

No pleasure is intrinsically bad; but the] means for achieving some pleasures [involve disturbances] that are far, [outweigh the pleasures.]

Fr.33

... such virtues ... pleasure ... and [of virtues] ... feels [much] pain ... the evil [is] ... [from] all virtues ... apart from tension ... pleasure, but these quibblers admit ... often found not ..., [and Zeno] himself [proposes] the opinion ..........., just as if he means virtue when he has said «pleasure,» and that men run to them. And again elsewhere having forgotten this hunger ([for they did] not [say that] ........) ... of this ... so that ... it ... in no way .... is able, as these people lay it down, like a bait, for all human beings, to draw them, like birds or fish, open-mouthed to the names of the virtues, and sometimes ........ itself ... [illusions (?). And you are] not ashamed, [you] wretched people, [of contradicting both yourselves and] one another: [for indeed, employing puerile] wit, [you reject] pleasure, while cleverly agreeing [with us about sensation], so that you not [prevented from] passing through [an area in safety], when you venture to climb crags.

Well now, I want to deflect also the error that, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip —an error that, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as ignorant. The error is this: [not] all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but some of them precede their effects, others [coincide with] them, and others follow them.

Examples of causes that precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be borne, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows.

Examples of coincident causes are [solid] and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, [sexual acts:] we do not eat [food] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink wine and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we emit semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, without awaiting the future.

[As for causes that follow, an example is expecting] to win praise after death: although men experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure occurs later.

Now you, being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with [pleasure), go completely astray.]

Fr. 33 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 10)

[If the things which are productive of pleasures for debauchees dispelled the minds’ fears about celestial phenomena and death and pains, and moreover taught the limit of desires] and of pains, we should have no reason to [censure such people], since they would be seated [with pleasures from every side] and [would] not [experience either mental] or physical pain —[pain which is the evil.]

Fr. 34

... reasoning ... [of happiness] ................... [is ... hope, after selection of these], and cure of erring emotions. So where, I say, the danger is great, so also is the fruit. Here we must turn aside these fallacious arguments on the grounds that they are insidious and insulting and contrived, by means of terminological ambiguity, to [lead] wretched human beings [astray] ....................... [let us] not [avoid every pain that is present, and let us not choose every pleasure, as the many always do. Each person must employ reasoning,] since he [will not always achieve immediate success: just as] exertion (?) [often] involves one [gain at the beginning and] certain [others as time passes by], so it is also with [experiencing pleasure;] for sowings of seeds do [not] bring [the same benefit] to the sower but we see some seeds very quickly germinating [and bearing fruit and others taking longer] ............... of pleasures and  [pains] ........ [pleasure].

And so the .......... [are] ....... If .................. [prudence.]

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.

Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

[Well, let us examine] our fear of the gods ...

Fr. 34 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 3)

[The quantitative limit of pleasure is the] removal of all pain. [Whoever experiences pleasure, so long as it continues, cannot ever be troubled] by pain of body or of mind or [of both together].

Fr. 35

As a matter of fact this fear is sometimes clear, sometimes not clear —clear when we avoid something manifestly harmful like fire through fear that we shall meet death by it, not clear when, while the mind is occupied with something else, it (fear) has insinuated itself into our nature and [lurks] ...

Fr. 35 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 3)

There would be [no] advantage [in securing protection against our fellow-men so long s phenomena above and below the earth and in general whatever happens in the boundless universe were matters of suspicion].

Fr. 36 ... [productive of pleasures] ...........

... [is] ....... ......... of [myth] ..... And ..... more of the [gods] .... most .....

Fr. 37

The soul furnishes nature with [the ultimate] cause [both of life and of] death. It is true that the number of its constituent atoms, both its rational and irrational parts being taken into account, does not equal that of the body; yet it girdles the whole man and, while being itself confined, binds him in its turn, just as the minutest quantity of acid juice binds a huge quantity of milk.

And this too is a sign, among many others, of the primacy of this cause: often, although the body has been beset by a long illness and has come to be so attenuated and emaciated that the withered skin is all but adhering to the bones and the constitution of the internal parts appears to be empty and bloodless, nevertheless, provided that the soul remains, it does not allow the creature to die. And this is not the only sign of its supremacy, but it is also the case that amputations of hands and often of whole arms or legs by fire and iron cannot unfasten life. So powerful is the dominion which the soul-part of us exercises over it. Contrariwise there are occasions when, although the body is intact and has suffered no diminution of its bulk [the faculty of sensation abandons it; for it is of no avail if the soul no longer remains and its union with] the body [is dissolved. But, as long as we see the same part still remaining as guardian, the] man [lives. Thus, as I said, the ultimate] cause [of life] is the soul [being united with] or [separated from the body.]

Fr. 37 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 5)

[It is impossible to live pleasurably without living prudently] and honourably and justly, and it is impossible to live prudently and honourably and justly [without living pleasurably. If a man lacks these qualities, it is impossible for him to live pleasurably].

Fr. 38

[The soul cannot survive separation from the body], since it is [necessary] to understand that it too is a part. By itself [the] soul cannot ever either exist (even though [Plato and the] Stoics talk a great deal of nonsense [on the subject]) or [experience movement], just as [the body does] not [possess sensation when the soul is released from it.]

Fr. 39

... in perpetual motion ... If ...., why then ............ we say ..... even to be .... this .... from (?) the ........ after the body, .... it ............... is joined with the body, if ... powerful .... when .......................... How then, Plato, will imperishability [come about] for you? Or how can this [in common language be called] (?) imperishable ....................?

The Stoics (wanting to say more singular things than others on this subject) deny that the souls are absolutely imperishable, but then say that those of fools are destroyed immediately after the parting of the body, while those of virtuous men survive, though they too are destroyed sometime. Well, observe the glaring implausibility of their view: they make their assertion as though the wise and the unwise, even if they do differ in intellectual ability, do not have the same mortality. Actually, I marvel more [at their restraint] —how it is that, once [the soul] is to have the power to exist separate from the [body], even if we say for the [briefest moment of time], and ... 

Fr. 39 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 29 = Sent. Vat. 20)

[Of the desires, some are natural and necessary; others] natural, but [not necessary]; and others neither natural nor [necessary, but the products of idle fancy.]

Fr. 40

[And let us not say that the soul transmigrated and did not perish, as the Orphics], and [not] only Pythagoras, crazily [suppose].

Fr. 40 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 25)

[If you do not at all the times refer each of your actions to the natural end, but instead, when making a choice or avoidance, turn aside to adopt some other criterion, your actions will not be in conformity with your principles].

Fr. 41

........ we ... the .... [not] as the adherents of Empedocles and Pythagoras [say]. For having [memory (?)] ........

Fr. 42

[Empedocles in regard to these matters borrowed his philosophy from Pythagoras. .................. going astray (?) he says] that the souls transmigrate from body to body after the first has been destroyed, and that this happens ad infinitum, as if someone is not going to say to him: «Empedocles, if the souls are able to survive independently and you have no need (?) to drag them into the nature of a living creature and to transfer them for this reason, how is the transmigration of use to you? For in [the] intervening time, during [which] their transmigration [is effected, interrupting] the nature of a living creature, they will be thrown into complete confusion (?). If on the other hand they are [in no way] able to survive [without] a body, why [exactly] do you give yourself —or rather them— this trouble, dragging them about and making them transmigrate from one [creature to] another? And these ....................................................................................................... [It would be preferable] to make the souls independent and absolutely indestructible and not to cause them to embark on a long, circuitous voyage, so that eventually your theory, though still fallacious, would command more respect. Otherwise we shall disbelieve you, Empedocles, with regard to [these] transmigrations.»

Fr. 42 lower margin (unknown maxim)

[Pain,] when it is slight, [does not destroy pleasure,] while great [pain is not long-lasting.]

NF 129 = 185

... [what is natural (?) ... and ... to the others ... I do not know why ......................................................................................

[For indeed, when] we [are dead, we shall certainly not experience continual wailings and groaning or] rivers [of hell and other such miseries, as] the myths [say we shall. So death is nothing] to us, [once sensation is absent], as I have [already] said [before] and [straightaway again] shall continue [also to maintain. For] among us (Epicureanism) mortality...

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Fr. 43

[Visions are not empty illusions of the mind], as the Stoics imagine, going completely astray. In fact they also have [the nature] of corporeal images [and] impressions similar in form to all these visible objects which their flux [allows us to apprehend], as I demonstrated also [in the] writing before this one, when I was elucidating the theories about [dreams.] 

Now these images do not in any way have [any] sensation, as Democritus [supposes, seeing that they are constructed] of [fine] atoms and are perceptible only [by the mind. If] they have the form of such things as are congenial to our nature, they make the soul exceedingly glad; but if of such things as are repugnant to our nature, they fill the whole man with a [great] perturbation and fear and [set] his heart pounding.

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Fr. 43 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 32)

For [all those animals which could not make compacts not to harm one another or] be harmed, nothing is either [just or indeed unjust. And the same is true of all those peoples witch could not or would not to make compacts not to harm or not to be harmed].

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Fr. 44

[The soul experiences] feelings far greater than the cause which generated them, just as [a fire] vast enough to burn down ports and cities is kindled by an exceedingly small spark. But the pre-eminence of these feelings of [the soul] is difficult for ordinary people to gauge: it is [im]possible to make a direct comparison by experiencing simultaneously the extremes of both (I mean of the feelings of the soul and of the body), since this seldom ever happens and, when it does happen, life is destroyed; and consequently the criterion for determining the pre-eminence of one of the two is not found. Instead, when someone encounters bodily pains, he says that these are greater than those of the soul; and when [he encounters those of the soul, he says that] they [are greater than the others. For] what [is present is] invariably more convincing [than what is absent], and each person is [likely] either through [necessity] or through pleasure, to confer pre-eminence on the feeling which has hold of him. However, this matter, which is difficult for ordinary people to gauge, a wise man calculates on the basis of many factors

Fr. 44 lower margin (Epic. Sent. 2)

[Pain in the flesh does not last continuously: extreme pain is present a very short time; pain which only just outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last many days; and chronic illnesses] permit a preponderance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.

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